The scope of this paper is to assess the impact of competition on industrial toxic pollution by using for the first time, a panel threshold model which allows evaluating the main drivers of toxic releases under two different market regimes. The empirical analysis is based on a micro level panel data set over the five year-period 1987-2012.
Introduction
Manufacturing activities such as metal mining, electric power generation, oil refining, recycling, use chemicals to produce the products we consume (i.e pharmaceuticals, computers, paints, clothing, automobiles, etc) . While the majority of toxic chemicals are managed by industrial facilities via strict regulations in order to minimize chemicals into the air, water and land, toxic releases do still occur as part of their everyday business operations (Levinson, 2015) . To give but an example, of the scale of their use, it is worth mentioning that in 2015 and only for the US almost 3.36 billion pounds of total chemical disposals (including on-site and off-site releases)
were released many of them can be regarded as hazardous waste. Hopefully, nearly 26 billion pounds covering approximately the 92% of total chemical waste (excluding metal mines), was not released into the atmosphere due to the use of preferred waste management practices such as recycling, energy recovery, and treatment (EPA, 2017) .
Based on the above considerations, it is common knowledge that industrial pollution affects the entire spectrum of the optimal use of natural and environmental resources to economic activity (Hsueh, 2015; Shapiro and Walker, 2015; Harrington et al, 2014; Bi and Khanna, 2012; Levinson, 2009) . Over the last ten years researchers have tried to disentangle this relationship. Specifically, one strand of literature tries to explore possible linkages between the level of environmental pollution and serious health problems such as asthma, infant health and mortality, lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases (see for example Rzhetsky et al, 2014; Agarwal et al, 2010; Currie et al 2009; Currie and Schmieder, 2008) . The second strand of literature, tries to investigate the possible spillover effects between environmental degradation and market structure (e.g. Simon and Prince, 2016; Branco and Villas-Boas, 2015; Fowlie, 2009) . It is well documented from prior theoretical studies that increased competition in an industry may result in lower levels of production per facility not allowing pollution to grow (Farber and Martin, 1986) . On the other hand, recent theoretical work claims that increased competition triggers the incentives of a firm to reduce costs in order to reduce its final prices and thus the pollution control activities (Shleifer, 2004) . This strand is rapidly growing. Our approach is one of the very few attempts at modeling and estimating the decision of US firms on their participation using facility level data. The main novelty of our study is that we use for the first time in the relevant literature a panel sample splitting methodology (threshold model) accounting for the decomposition of Significant Market Power (SMP) in an industry and linking the possible interactions with the level of industrial pollution. 1 In this way, we argue that an industry needs to cross a certain level of market concentration (competition) in order to restrict environmental degradation. Explanations offered to account for this argument broadly fall into two categories. According to the first, it is the nature of data and differences in empirical methodology (i.e misspecification and measurement 1 In oligopolistic markets, SMP is evident in an industry/sector when prices exceed marginal cost (MC) and long run average cost (LAVC), so the firm makes positive economic profits.
error, existence of outliers, lack of data quality, etc) justifying that the effect of competition on industrial pollution might be non-linear. But there is also an economic motivation emphasizing for this justification. More specifically, in oligopolistic sectors (i.e energy, steel industry, oil refining, cement industry, etc) which are characterised by high market concentration and absence of effective competition as a result of the existence of SMP by the incumbent, there are usually strict environmental regulations (i.e taxes, tariffs, fees, etc) in order to limit environmental degradation (Halkos and Papageorgiou, 2016) . On the other hand, pollution (i.e toxic chemical releases) rises (falls) with an increase (decrease) of market concentration suggesting that environmental damage is more likely to evolve in oligopolistic sectors (Simon and Prince, 2016; Fowlie, 2009) . Based on these justifications, we argue that competition might be different in the two regimes (concentrated and non-concentrated industries). In other words, instead of assuming a linear effect in which we attribute the full impact to one variable (i.e market concentration) we allow this effect to vary at different values of market structure.
Our approach strongly accounts for the presence of cross section dependence while it utilizes "second-generation" panel unit root tests in order to uncover possible cointegrated relationships an issue that has been overlooked by the existing empirical literature. The reason for using this kind of unit root testing can be justified by the fact that traditional stationarity tests (known as "first-generation" tests) suffer from size distortions and the ignorance of cross section dependence (Pesaran 2015) .
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, it goes beyond the existing literature in that it uses a unique micro level dataset originated from thousands industrial facilities (polluters) dispersed among the 50 US states. This will help us to empirically explore the net effect of competition on facility-level emissions. Second, it utilizes a panel threshold approach with certain innovations such as the inclusion of structural market characteristics and the treatment of a second threshold in the sample.
This technique has been widely used by the literature to identify threshold effects when the variable of interest is observable, but the position of the threshold is not known. Third, and foremost, the paper unveils a stable non-linear inverted "V-shaped" relationship between market concentration and industrial pollution already hidden by the existing literature. Taken together, this set of findings is important in that it provides useful policy implications towards the abatement of toxic chemical releases in order to achieve sustainability.
Using a panel threshold framework in the spirit of Hansen (2000), we show that the reason for the mixed evidence of the impact of competition on environmental degradation, (proxied by toxic chemical releases) in an industry lies with its level of market concentration. This implies that market structure cannot assert its role in the process of environmental pollution until an industry crosses a certain threshold level of concentration. Our findings remain robust across alternative market concentration measures (CR4 and HHI). However, the driving force that pushes competition to alter its behaviour toward the level of environmental pollution based on a specific threshold point (generating a "kinked" curve) provides an interesting opportunity for future theoretical and empirical research.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature.
Section 3 describes the data and the relevant empirical testing for cross-section dependence and unit roots. Section 4 portrays the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings of the study, while Section 6 performs some necessary robustness checks. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the paper and provides some policy implications.
Literature review
There is a widespread belief that competition is regarded as a reliable mechanism for stimulating both allocative and technical efficiency (Leibenstein 1966) . As suggested by many researchers (Zhang et al, 2005; Zhang et al, 2008; Akkemik and Oguz, 2011) , in a competitive market, prices and profits provide the firm with incentives to improve efficiency minimising costs. Further, competition in network industries such as electricity would deliver production and allocative efficiency, hence lower prices, or lower mark-up over costs (Fiorio and Florio, 2013; Chiara Del Bo and Florio, 2012 ). This will lead to higher industrial output, while lower per-unit costs resulting from increased technical efficiency may be passed through in lower prices, thus increasing the quantity demanded and subsequently the level of environmental pollution (Polemis and Stengos, 2016) . Although the positive impacts of competition on total welfare are widely acknowledged by the economists the effect that competition has on environmental pollution is under scrutiny.
Despite the profound interest by policy makers and government officials on the possible spillovers between market competition and environmental degradation the existing literature is still in its infancy, with controversial results. These can be justified by the fact that many researchers acknowledge that competition may have positive as well as negative effects on environmental pollution (Simon and Prince, 2016; Branco and Villas-Boas, 2015; Fowlie, 2009; Mansur 2007; Shleifer, 2004) .
In a seminal theoretical paper, Farber and Martin (1986) argue that increased competition lowers industrial output, and thus, at least lowers average production per plant. Therefore, an increase in the environmental pollution along with the production expansion will create a positive effect on the environmental degradation resulting in less pollution per facility. Moreover, they posit that increased competition leads to less abatement efforts by firms, since firms in more concentrated industries spend more on combating air and water pollution than firms in less concentrated industries.
Subsequent work by Shleifer (2004) indicates that effective competition tends to increase the incentives of a firm to undercut costs in order to reduce prices. This can be broadly implemented to combating pollution in a sense that companies may pursue cost reducing strategies, by reducing pollution control activities.
In another study, Fowlie (2009) Based on the above, the existing studies do not properly incorporate the spillovers generated by the inclusion of competition on the pollution-abatement nexus since they totally neglect the notion of a sample splitting variable acting as a separator between two different market regimes (more competition vs less competition). Our model estimates an unknown threshold parameter in a data driven approach that "endogenously" sorts the data into the two different market regimes, whereby each regime would differ according to the prevailing attitudes of its members towards competition (Polemis and Stengos, 2017) . The threshold variable that we use to sort observations is the level of concentration measured by well documented in the literature structural indices (CR n , and Hirschman-Herfindahl index or HHI).
Subsequently, the sample facilities will be sorted according to the level of market concentration placing them into competitive (i.e taking low values of the index) and non-competitive (i.e. taking high values of the index). The purpose of this study is to fill these research gaps by combining certain structural industry characteristics (i.e level of employment, capital intensity, market concentration, value added, etc) drawn from a micro economic perspective with the facility-level of toxic chemical releases.
Data and empirical testing
The primary source for our data was drawn from the Toxics Release Inventory The relevant database is rapidly growing since in 1987, it included nearly 275 toxic chemicals, while by 2015 this number had nearly doubled, to 600 chemicals, with some of the original chemicals dropped from the reporting requirements.
However, for purposes of consistency, we restrict our sample to the 234 chemicals that appeared in the 1987 dataset and have been reported in every year since (Simon and Prince, 2016) . Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the set of chemicals included in the TRI has evolved over time since primarily new chemicals have been added.
However for consistency purposes we have excluded them from the sample selection.
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The structural variables such as market concentration, level of employment, value added that correspond to each 6-digit code were drawn from the National CR50 and HHI), we used data directly from the US Census of Manufacturers. The 2 Facilities are required to report their toxic releases to the EPA if they meet the following three criteria: (1) They have ten or more full-time employees (or the equivalent); (2) They are in a covered industry (all manufacturing industries, mining, electricity generation, hazardous waste facilities, along with some publishing and wholesale trade industries); and (3) They "manufactured" or "processed" more than 25,000 pounds or "otherwise used" more than 10,000 pounds of any listed toxic chemical during a calendar year. Plants that meet the first two criteria must report releases for each toxic chemical that exceeds the threshold in (3).
latter is only conducted every five years limiting our time span to six years (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012) . We must mention though that while there are obvious benefits of having a strongly-balanced panel, there are costs as well. Due to the fact that TRI database constitutes an unbalanced panel, observations were dropped to balance the panel thus restricting a 25 year panel to 6 years.
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we take five measures of market concentration: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 largest firms in the industry 3 , CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio, CR8 is the eight-firm concentration ratio, CR20, is the twenty-firm concentration ratio and finally CR50, is the fifty-firm concentration ratio. It is worth mentioning that our measures of market structure reveal the existence or the absence of effective competition in the industry since concentration is simply the inverse of competition (Cabral, 2017) .
Our sample consists of thousands observations, namely, 2,461 panels (facilities) times 6 years, and the panel data set is strongly balanced. We excluded observations for facilities with missing values for toxic chemical releases. Hence our sample includes 14,767 plants, spread across 356 six-digit NAICS industry codes.
Especially, for the years 1987 and 1992 we used the SIC classification. Similarly to Simon and Prince (2016) we used the TRI database in order to incorporate the level of toxic chemical releases in our sample. However, there is significant difference in the magnitude of the two samples. Our sample consists of nearly 11,900 facility year observations, while the aforementioned study includes more than 80,000 observations. This discrepancy is the result of merging the two databases (i.e TRI with the NBER dataset). Lastly, similarly to Simon and Prince (2016), we were able to merge 3 The calculation of the HHI squares each market share (MS) and places a higher importance on those firms that have a larger market share. The formula is as follows: HHI = MS 1 2 + MS 2 2 + MS 3 2 + …+ MSn 2 . The HHI ranges from zero (Perfect competition) to unity (Monopoly).
chemical releases data with national industry concentration ratios drawn from the NBER database and the Census of Manufacturers (only for the year 2012) since each facility must indicate the primary operated industry.
The starting date for the study was dictated by data availability, while the final date (2012), represents the last year for which data regarding the Census of
Manufacturers were available at the time the research was conducted. Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for our sample variables. For the sample of facilities, the level of toxic releases averages 461,833 pounds (or 10.12 pounds in logged values).
Similarly, the level of market concentration (measured by the four concentration ratios) ranges from 38 to 80. This masks a wide disparity across facilities and across time. It is also worth mentioning that the starting year of our sample (1987) where the TRI was reported, the median facility released 50,498 pounds of toxic chemicals. By 2012, median facility releases had fallen to below 16,858 pounds, a roughly 67% reduction.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Preliminary Testing for Cross-Section Dependence and Unit Roots
One of the additional complications that arise when dealing with panel data compared to the pure time-series case, is the possibility that the variables or the random disturbances are correlated across the panel dimension. The early literature on unit root and cointegration tests adopted the assumption of no cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran, 2015) . However, it is common for macro-level data to violate this assumption which will result in low power and size distortions of tests that assume cross-section independence. For example, cross-section dependence in our data may arise due to common unobserved effects due to changes in federal legislation. Therefore, before proceeding to unit root and cointegration tests we test for cross-section dependence (Halkos and Polemis, 2017) . We use the cross-section dependence tests proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Pesaran (2004) . 4 The tests are based on the estimation of the linear panel model of the form:
(1) where and are the time and panel dimensions respectively, the provincial-specific intercept, and a vector of regressors, and the random disturbance term. The null hypothesis in both tests assumes the existence of crosssection correlation: for all and for all . This is tested against the alternative hypothesis that for at least one pair of and . The Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Pesaran (2004) tests are a type of Lagrange-Multiplier test that is based on the errors obtained from estimating Equation 1 by the OLS method. Both tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence (P-value = 0.000) for all the models, providing evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the data given the statistical significance of the CD statistic (see Table   2 ). In light of this evidence we proceed to test for unit roots using tests that are robust to cross-section dependence.
<Insert Table 2 
about here>
To examine the stationarity properties of the variables in our models we use the "second generation" unit root tests for panel-data proposed by Breitung and Das (2005) and Pesaran (2007) that allow for cross-section dependence. Both tests are based on OLS regressions; however the Breitung and Das approach breaks down if it is assumed that cross-correlation is due to common factors while the Pesaran (2007) test, denoted as CIPS, remains valid (Halkos and Polemis, 2017) . The test results
suggest that all the sample variables are stationary I(0). 5 Hence we proceed with testing for the presence of thresholds.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Econometric framework
We proceed with the estimation of the threshold regression model, where the concentration ratio (CR4) is used as the sorting (threshold) variable that classifies the facilities in a competitive and a non-competitive industry regime. Hansen (1999; 2000) provides an estimation method based on a Concentrated Least Squares (CLS) procedure and he obtains the properties of the threshold and slope parameter estimators. In other words, the approach that we employ here does not rely on a known threshold parameter, but one that needs to be estimated along-side the other unknown parameters of the model. However, the method is based on first testing for the presence of a threshold effect. Once we reject the null of no threshold(s) we proceed in the estimation of the model that includes the estimation of the threshold(s)
and allows for the sample split. The technique is based on a CLS method that splits the model into the two regimes, whereby there is a full interaction of all the variables with the (estimated) threshold.
We proceed to test for the presence of a (significant) threshold that allows for the comparison between the TR model and the simple linear benchmark without a threshold. It is worth noting that the threshold parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold and usual test statistics have non-standard distributions. For that reason, Hansen (1999 Hansen ( , 2000 suggests a bootstrap methodology based on the utilization of a heteroskedasticity consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap procedure to test H 0 of a linear formulation against a threshold formulation.
We argue though that an alternative, but less sophisticated approach to investigating non-linear effects would be to simply use higher order polynomial regressors of market concentration (squared, cubed terms, etc) instead of a panel threshold model. One could also resort alternatively to a semiparametric specification using local smoothers or splines/series to capture possible turning points. However such methods involve bandwidth choices and they do not lend themselves to estimating sharp turning points/thresholds as it is the case in the threshold model that we adopt in a fully interactive way (Kourtelos et al, 2016) . Moreover, one important advantage of this methodology is that it avoids the ad hoc, subjective pre-selection of threshold values which has been a major critique of previous studies (Christie, 2014) .
In contrast to a simple case where the sample is split according to a known preassigned threshold value, the method that we use first tests for the presence of such a threshold and then estimates it (see for example Hansen, 2000; Caner and Hansen, 2004 and Kourtellos et al, 2016) . In principle, one can test for additional sample splits, something that we did and we were able to detect. Based on the above, our threshold model takes the following form:
where subscripts j = 1,...ν, denote the facility (plant) that generates the chemical releases, i = 1, ..., N represent the six-digit code industry and t = 1, … , T indexes the time. n i is the firm-specific fixed effect that control for differences across facilities such as technological innovations and chemicals used in the production process, capturing individual heterogeneity. We also include the relevant year (time)
fixed effect (v t ) which captures the co movement of the series due to external shocks (Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 2016 
The interpretation of the variables comes as follows. lnREL ijt , denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases emitted by facility j in industry i across the year t. lnSHIP it is the logged value of shipments as a proxy for market size for industry i during year t. CR4 it , is one of our four concentration ratios of market structure allowing for certain cyclical behaviour (nonlinearities) in the impact of the covariates on the dependent variable. 8 lnVADD it , is the total value added for industry i during year t as a proxy for industry output expressed in natural logarithm. lnEMP it, is the logged value of total employment for industry i during year t as a proxy for 6 We have also estimated our threshold model with the inclusion of the other three market concentration measures (i.e CR8, CR20 and CR50) as a robustness check and the results do not change significantly. The results are available upon request. 7 The results do not drastically change if we estimate a semi logged model similar to Simon and Prince (2016) . 8 For the use of concentration ratios see also Polemis and Stengos (2015) .
labour. lnINVEST it , denotes the total capital expenditure for industry i during year t as a proxy for capital, and subsequently lnCAP it , is the total real capital stock for industry i during year t as a proxy for intermediate inputs. Moreover, n i is the unitspecific residual that differs between sectors but remains constant for any particular sector (unobserved sector level effect); while u t captures the time effect and therefore differs across years but is constant for all sectors in a particular year. Finally ε it denotes the error term.
Results and discussion
In this section, we present the results of the threshold fixed effects model along with the benchmark linear specification for each of the two alternative measures of market concentration (threshold variables). In addition, we offer a comparative discussion between the threshold effects and the static panel fixed effects linear specification benchmark models.
Testing for thresholds and estimating the linear model
We carry out the first part of the empirical analysis by determining the number of thresholds. For this reason, Equation (2) is estimated by OLS, allowing for (sequentially) zero, one and two thresholds respectively. The test statistics LM 1 and LM 2 , along with their bootstrap p-values, are shown in Table 4 . Specifically, we find that the test for a single threshold LM 1 is highly significant in both models with a bootstrap p-value of 0.00. On the other hand, the test for a second threshold LM 2 is also highly statistically significant, with a bootstrap p-value for each of the two models (Model I and II) equal to 0.00 and 0.00 respectively. As a consequence, we infer that there are two thresholds in all of the regression relationships.
<Insert Table 4 Table 5 about here > However, as it will be shown below, the results of the benchmark static model compared with the threshold effects model that we use in the present study reveal significant differences in the interpretation of the key variable of interest (market concentration). This means that the benchmark model does not capture the nonlinear effects stemmed from the existence of a double threshold according to the bootstrapped P-values of the relevant LM tests (see Table 4 ). Therefore, the threshold model is better suited to assess these effects on chemical releases under two different regimes (competitive and non-competitive conditions).
< Insert

The threshold model
The results for the empirical relation between the (logged) toxic chemical releases and its main drivers under the tow regimes (competitive and non-competitive conditions) are depicted in Table 6 . When the level of the four largest industries in the sector (CR4) is taken into account as the threshold variable (Model I) it is evident that nearly all of the control variables are statistically significant and plausibly signed.
(Model I) < Insert Table 6 Table 5 ). On the other hand, the results for the non-linear model with a (double) threshold on market concentration at 67 percent, do suggest a strong non-linear relationship between competition and pollution. The point estimates suggest that the level of concentration (competition) is positively (negatively) related to the level of toxic chemical releases when time dummies are taken into account (see columns 1 and 2). However, it is evident that the CR4 index is more important in the sample below the threshold (competitive regime) since the relevant coefficient (2.336) is highly statistically significant. This means that a 10% decrease in the level of market concentration leads to a 23% decrease in the total chemical releases. This finding concurs that for already competitive sectors the level of market concentration does affect industrial output and subsequently the level of toxic releases emitted in the atmosphere. These results are in alignment with existing studies (Farber and Martin, 1986; Simon and Prince, 2016) where it is supported that competition effect would tend to lower pollution per facility.
Notably on pollution is evident in all of the specifications (see columns 1,2,5 and 6).
The discussion now turns to the alterative measure of market concentration namely the logged value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (lnHHI). Although difficult in its computation, the HHI provides a better measure of market concentration since it takes into account all the market shares of the firms in an industry (here the first fifty firms) compared to the concentration ratio of the four largest firms (Cabral, 2017) . More specifically, the relationship between competition and toxic releases is negative (positive) when the threshold is high (low). This means that for observations falling into low regime (competitive) market concentration induces firms to increase output and hence the total level of pollution highlighting a positive net effect of competition, while the opposite holds for the high regime (non-competitive). This finding traces out the existence of an inverted "V-shaped" relationship between market concentration and industrial pollution at facility level. 10 More specifically, we are the first to uncover a non-linear statistically significant relationship between competition and industrial toxic releases for both above and below the threshold (665 units or 6.5 in logarithmic scale).
In particular, when the market concentration of the average facility is below the threshold, a one percent increase in the level of competition will reduce toxic emissions by 0.81 and 1.15 percent respectively (see columns 3 and 7). In this case we are on the upward slopping part of the curve. However, if the average facility is above the threshold then a one percent decrease in the level of competition will result in an increase of toxic releases by 0.52 and 0.65 percent respectively in both specifications (with and without time effects). This means that we are on the downward sloping part of the concentration-pollution curve. As a consequence, the impact of competition on industrial pollution is larger quantitatively when it is below the estimated threshold.
Lastly, regarding the remaining variables we find that the estimated value of shipments is positive and statistically significant in both regimes ranging from 0.550 to 0.954. Similarly to Model I, the magnitude of this variable is larger when the observations fall above than below the threshold (0.929 compared to 0.595 when time dummies exist). The level of value added and the employment are negatively correlated with the level of industrial pollution, while capital expenditures reveal a strong positive effect on toxic releases. Finally, the coefficient of capital stock is around to unity on average when the observations are classified above and below the threshold.
Robustness checks
In order to check for the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our basic linear model which is accordingly adjusted for the presence of three distinct concentration variables namely CR8, CR20 and CR50 respectively. These structural indicators capture the impact of the eight, twenty and fifty largest firms (measured on a 1-100 scale) in the industry respectively.
The empirical results when different aspects of market power are taken into account do not reveal significant differences regarding the competition variables and the set of the other covariates including the interaction terms. It is worth mentioning that, these interaction terms completely change the meaning of the coefficient on concentration. In other words the latter indicates the marginal effect of concentration when all the other RHS variables (that are interacted with concentration) are equal to zero (i.e when the logged values of these variables are equal to one). Despite the presence of so many interaction terms the empirical findings do not reveal significant discrepancies between the linear specifications and the TR model as already examined implying that the results are rather robust.
Nearly in all of the specifications, the control variables are statistically significant with the appropriate signs (see Table I The empirical findings indicate that when concentration level increases up to that point industries' toxic releases levels are also increasing. However after that estimated peak ("turning point'') it is evident that the regression line slightly decreases henceforth, revealing a negative effect of competition on environmental degradation. In other words, within this interval, the logged level of concentration has a positive impact on environmental pollution (decreasing part of the curve) creating an inverted "V-shaped" curve. Lieb (2003) asserts that the upturn of an inverted "Ushaped" Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) may be justified by the achievement of the internalization of the pollution externality on top of that the control chances are exhausted. On the contrary, the declining part of the curve may be because of a shock.
These set of empirical findings could be important for policy makers, academic researchers and practitioners. More specifically, they call for the need to strengthen the effectiveness of ecological-friendly policies by taking into consideration the market structure and the subsequent level of competition in an industry in order to drastically abate chemical pollution. Specifically, policy makers and government officials have to stimulate investments in value added sectors (i.e energy sector) and more likely to promote the use of renewable energy sources. This can be accompanied by more financial resources for research and development and more cost effective mitigation methods. Note: All variables except for the concentration measures (i.e CR4, CR8, CR20, CR50 and HHI) are expressed in natural logarithms. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. Pesaran (2004) . The p-values are for a one-sided test based on the normal distribution. Correlation and Absolute (correlation) are the average (absolute) value of the off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional correlation matrix of residuals. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest companies in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. Significant at *** The number of lags has been set to two according to BIC. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test is used rather than PhillipsPerron test. The null hypothesis assumes that the variable contains unit root. lnREL denotes the logged total (on-site and off-site) chemical releases. lnSHIP is the logged value of shipments. lnCR4 is the logged concentration ratio of the four largest compa nies in the sector. lnCR8 is the logged concentration ratio of the eight largest companies in the sector. lnCR20 is the logged concentration ratio of the twenty largest companies in the sector lnCR50 is the logged concentration ratio of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnHHI is the logged Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the fifty largest companies in the sector. lnVADD, is the natural logarithm of the total value added. LEMP denotes the logged value of total employment. lnINVEST stands for the total capital expenditure and lnCAP is the total real capital stock. Significant at *** 1%. 
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